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CIA/CP

State Dept. review completed

Memorandum of Conversation Between the DCI
and US Arms Negotiators in Geneva
6 November 1982

Ambassador Rowney -- START

Soviet concern for new US missile systems, particularly cruise missiles, is the greatest inhibitant to substantive progress in START. The personal demeanor of Soviet negotiators has been good except when they have (apparently) been directed to flare up in anger.

CIA responsiveness to the needs of the US negotiating team has shown marked improvement over its rather "laid back" attitude toward SALT II.

The US has not yet exhausted its initiatives in the negotiations. We are ahead of the Soviets in our homework. We have more details yet to lay out. The Soviets still have no figures to offer, but they admit that they must talk numbers.

For our own information we need to do three things:

- A. Spell out in outline form the basic elements of what we want in a treaty.
- B. Solidify our views on mobile systems. By the time MX "goes public" we should know how we want the mobility issue to come out. (Ed. note: The President's speech of 22 November may have constituted the "public" exposure envisioned by Amb. Rowney.)
- C. The negotiating team needs technical parameters of the Backfire bomber to compare with Soviet data. The Soviets have not fully responded to questions put to them in this regard, but they seem to think they have.

The Soviets view national technical means of verification as adequate for all aspects of START. They do not seem to understand why the US would want more.

After January 1, 1983 we will probably see a Soviet trend toward development of a propaganda offensive against US inflexibility in START negotiations. It is apparent that they plan to hold INF negotiations hostage to START. They probably will not negotiate for less than 2400 strategic systems if we deploy any INF systems. Sometimes, however, the leading Soviet negotiator will take an opposite position, insisting that INF is

SECRET

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treated in "another arena" and should not be linked to START.

The Soviets have presented a number of principles which they believe should guide the negotiations. The US has not responded because we don't buy a lot of their "principles." Confidence building measures (CBM) are no guarantee of security because the Soviets have a great force advantage at present. There is no assurance that a crisis cannot lead to war in spite of CBM because of the force imbalance.

We need a Presidential speech on how unreasonable the current Soviet position is. The Soviets are paranoid about cruise missiles and stealth. We ought to be able to use their paranoia somehow to our advantage. High level repetition of the US position would help both on the domestic front and in convincing the Soviets that they need to come down in their force level limitations. The US voice must continue to stress equality of forces between the superpowers.

The Soviets argue that the cruise missile must be considered a potential first strike weapon because of the development of stealth technology. So far they have not talked about submarine launched cruise missiles. We argue that the numbers of ICBM warheads and throw-weight are the real issues. They want to focus on cruise missiles and stealth.

Ambassador Ellis -- Standing Consultative Commission

The Soviets value their arms accords and want to protect them. We have kicked them with our failure to ratify SALT II, and they have been patient. We should guard against making the situation worse in the way we proceed now.

With respect to our treaty review, we did not reply to the Soviets until late June, and they have become suspicious that we are dragging out the review too much. So far they have reacted mildly, but they will gain a psychological advantage if we don't get on with the review.

We are uncertain about how the coupling of an ABM system with the deployed MX will impact on the treaty. We need to know what our posture will be and how it will affect the treaty. We don't want to give the Soviets reason to argue that we are stalling the review.

The May 31st Presidential policy statement on US compliance with arms control accords has been interpreted by the Soviets as putting a blessing on SALT II. They are pleased with that development. We were correct in raising the SS-16 deployment issue, and should go as far as possible with that. The Soviets feel challenged to respond for fear that the US won't undertake the treaty review. We may learn something from their reply.

SECRET

Ambassador Nitze -- INF

Ambassador Rowney suggests that INF is hostage to START. I think we can also say that START is hostage to INF.

The Soviet theme is that we are stalling the negotiations so that we can deploy INF. They argue that they are making concessions, but a zero based option is impossible. They insist that forward based aircraft and the British and French nuclear forces must be included in an agreement. They say that Soviet forces in the Far East are a separate matter and should not be discussed in context with INF.

The Soviets do not want to remove any SS-20's, they want no US INF deployed, and they insist forward based nuclear aircraft be counted. They do not argue with our description of their position. They want the two sides to converge on equality, but they disagree on the basic data.

We will continue to explore for opportunities for progress. The zero option is a good one. We can't control aircraft* and we should make no compensation for British or French systems. We should insist that SS-20's in the Far East be counted because they are mobile.

With respect to verification and data, the Soviets have nothing to offer. We should wait until they come up with data on their side. In the meanwhile, we are making some progress on the text of a treaty.

The Soviets have a new variation on their 300-300 system balance. They say 0-0 would be all right if British and French systems were included. They will move to a 200 system sublimit on missiles on each side. The other 100 would probably be Backfires for them. Much depends upon how we define "Europe" for determining which systems are counted and which are not.

Soviet concerns for cruise missiles are based upon the difficulty of interception. They fear that the deployment of US cruise missiles would deprive them of their capability to win a theater nuclear war.

Ambassador Glitman -- Deputy for INF

The Soviets are using fear tactics, but the NATO Allies are aware of what is going on. We need to be ready to preempt the Soviet tactics (such as walking out). We also need to talk less in public about how "serious" the talks are and more about how good our position is.

*Ed. note: Amb. Nitze probably meant that we cannot prevent the Soviets from bringing up the aircraft issue.

SECRET

We need to remember that we are acting as agents for the NATO Allies. They have their own laws about on-site inspections. This could apply to the zero option, too. Concrete is being poured in the UK. The British and Italians have raised the issue of compliance with national laws. We must consult more closely with the Allies as we move ahead.

We need to know what motivates the Soviets in pursuing their line. Is it the changing leadership? paranoia? Fear of new weapons? Or is it just negotiating tactics?

Ambassador Goodby -- Deputy for START

There are five issues with regard to verification:

- Denial of flight test data. We need an agreement on limits of encryption.
- Mobility of ICBM. There must be verification.
- Cruise missiles. How can we tell a nuclear missile from a conventional one? And how do we deal with SLCM?
- Reconstitution. We should have a statement this month. Some factors are unverifiable.
- Counting rules. Warheads actually on missiles are more important than the number tested.

We also need to feel out possibilities for a trade-off between cruise missiles and throw-weight.